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Contracting Public Services in 
New York State
Labour Effects
ROBERT HEBDON1
This study examines 54 cases of restructuring public services 
in towns and counties in upstate New York. The 54 cases include 
39 cases of privatization in the form of contracting out, nine 
cases of contracting back in, and six cases of contracting out 
services to another government. Local government privatization 
was found to have some harmful effects on workers. Few local 
employers had adjustment policies to protect affected employees 
and disproportionate negative impacts were found on women and 
minorities. Privatization was also found to have significant de-
unionizing effects. On the other hand, it had no clear impact on 
wages and benefits. The role of unions in the restructuring process 
is more complex than was previously thought. Unions were the 
catalyst for opposition actions but only in cases involving for-profit 
restructuring. In the nine cases that involved contracting work back 
into the public sector, unions supported restructuring changes, and 
in the six cases of contracting out to another government, union 
opposition was not significant.
Faced with financial pressures and neo-conservative ideologies, 
public managers have increasingly restructured public services in North 
America. Contracting out, the most studied form of privatization, has 
been at the centre of a debate over the role of the private sector in service 
provision (Savas, 2000; Sclar, 2000). Somewhat lost in this discourse is 
a careful examination of the impact of restructuring on employees and 
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their unions. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the impact 
of service contracting on unions and employees of cases at the local level
of government in New York State.
The cases analyzed were drawn from a larger survey of townships 
and counties in upstate New York (outside New York City) by the author
and Mildred Warner (Warner and Hebdon, 2001). The 1997 survey asked 
chief elected officials about restructuring decisions since 1990 in all 
townships and upstate counties. In the last part of the survey, respondents 
were asked to provide brief descriptive summaries of restructuring cases, 
together with a contact person and telephone number. The author employed 
a computer-assisted research team (CAST) at Cornell University to conduct 
a telephone survey using these contacts to examine various labour effects 
of the contracting for services process (discussed more fully below).
The paper begins with a brief overview of the New York state context 
at the time of the survey. The literature on the labour effects of privatization 
is then reviewed. Next, the data, methodology, and hypotheses are presented 
followed by the results and a conclusion.
THE NEW YORK STATE ENVIRONMENT
It is useful to examine some of the factors that condition the  privatization 
environment in New York at the time of this study. This context is important 
not only to understand the external factors in play, but also to examine limits 
on the applicability of the findings. Public employees in New York State 
are covered by the Taylor Law that provides for collective bargaining over 
a broad range of issues. The law, for example, requires negotiation over 
some aspects of contracting out (Donovan and Orr, 1982). New York ranked 
in the top two or three in unionization (as measured by union density) in 
both public and private sectors (BLS, 1998). For example, in 1998 New 
York’s public sector union density was over 70 percent while the average 
figure in the U.S. was 37.5 percent (BLS, 1998). Given the high levels 
of unionization, the existence of New York’s Taylor Law, and generally 
labour-friendly democratic governors, New York state was one of the least 
privatized states in the country in 1995 (Lauder Report, 1992).
In 1992, New York experienced a political change to a republican 
Governor, George Pataki, with an aggressive privatization agenda (see Lauder 
Report, 1992). Given this change and the fact that some 70 percent of the 
local politicians in the larger survey from which these cases were drawn 
were Republicans, the expectation was that there would be a new wave of 
privatization. The cases analyzed in this paper occurred in the three-year 
period immediately following the election of George Pataki as Governor.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Effects on Workers
The empirical question of the impact of privatization on workers has 
generated a vigorous debate in the literature. Proponents of privatization 
assert that workers do not lose job security, wages or conditions, or 
unionization as a result of contracting out (Savas, 2000). It is further 
argued that public employers provide generous adjustment policies for 
affected employees such as early retirement, job transfer, and no layoff 
policies (Savas, 2000). Others maintain, on the other hand, that public 
sector employees suffer lower wages and job loss (Kuttner, 1999). Also 
public sector unions have argued that contracting out adversely affects 
wages and benefits; often results in job loss; is a direct attack on unions 
and collective bargaining; and has a disproportionate effect on women and 
minorities (Dantico, 1987).
A survey of local government public works directors in the U.S. showed 
that unionized cities are less likely to privatize, but this opposition is not 
expressed through collective bargaining but by political action (Chandler 
and Feuille, 1991). Privatized public sector jobs shift from the public sector 
to the private service sector. Unionization in the private service sector in 
the U.S. has been between 5 percent and 6 percent for much of the past 
25 years and has always been significantly lower than both the public and 
manufacturing sectors (BLS, 2004). Thus, the probability of remaining 
unionized after contracting out is extremely small. In terms of average union 
densities, for example, workers in the private service sector are seven times 
less likely to be unionized than in the public sector (BLS, 2004).
There is very little research on the post-privatization effects on 
labour (World Bank, 1999). An exception was a study of the U.S. Federal 
Government (GAO, 1985). It showed that 53 percent of the workers that 
took jobs with contractors had lower wages, 21 percent had higher wages, 
and in 25 percent of the cases, wages were the same. At the local level of 
government, it was also found that contractor wages were lower for bus 
drivers and mechanics even where the contractor was unionized (Peterson, 
Davis, and Walker, 1986).
In a national study of local government, Jackson (1997) examined the 
attempt by public employers to manage tensions between management and 
employees caused by private service delivery. She defined three categories 
of adjustment strategies: internal (retraining, early retirement, transfers); 
selective use plans (apply only to new services, tie to attrition); and private 
sector contracts (job offers to displaced workers, wage parity, affirmative 
action requirement). Two-thirds of cities in this national survey reported 
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no labour adjustment strategy for privatization. Only 33 percent overall 
employed adjustment techniques in one of the three Jackson categories 
and only 15 percent of cities used at least one program in each of the three 
categories.
A case study of privatization in Canada Post revealed that affected 
postal employees had post-privatization unemployment rates two and one-
half times the national average despite the existence of a comprehensive 
employer adjustment policy (White and Janzen, 2000).
Privatization has been found to adversely impact minorities by 
disproportionately displacing them through contracting out, by reducing 
their employment mobility opportunities, and by diminishing their living 
standards, thereby increasing the discrimination wage gap with whites. 
There is ample evidence that governments employ minorities and women in 
higher numbers than in the private sector. According to data obtained from 
the Current Population Survey, women and blacks comprise 39.0 percent 
and 12.8 percent of all wage and salary earners in the U.S., respectively 
(BLS, 2000). But in public administration, women and blacks were 
currently 44.0 percent and 24.0 percent, respectively, of total wage and 
salary earners (BLS, 2000). Not only do governments employ more women 
and blacks, but women have higher salaries and are more likely to be in 
professional jobs than in the private sector (Dantico, 1987; Thurow, 1982). 
Similarly, blacks are also higher paid in government and are more likely 
to be in professional and managerial occupations than blacks in the private 
sector (Joint Center for Political Studies, 1985). Thurow (1982) found, for 
example, that women’s salaries were 20 percent higher and minorities’ 
salaries 30 percent higher in public employment than in the private sector. 
This result is due mainly to the higher levels of responsibility achieved by 
women and blacks in government employment.
The privatization policies of the Thatcher Government in the 1980s 
produced an extensive literature that examined various industrial relations 
effects. While the political will of Governor Pataki might have paralleled 
Thatcher’s a decade earlier, New York’s Governor lacked the legal 
authority to force privatization on local government. Despite this contextual 
difference, the U.K. experience is relevant to that of New York.
Pendleton (1999) compared conditions in 22 privatized firms with
25 public ones in the bus services industry in the United Kingdom. Several 
hypotheses were tested about the impact of privatization on industrial 
relations. Pendleton’s study is of interest for at least two reasons: the 
bus industry has an equal mix of private and public firms competing for 
contracts, and a clear policy goal of the Thatcher Government was to weaken 
union power and influence.
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Pendleton found few or no differences between private and public firms 
on the extent of unionization and collective bargaining; however, wages 
were significantly lower in the private firms. The level of competition 
in the local market had no significant impact on any of these findings. 
Pendleton’s (1999) finding concerning the lack of impact on unionization 
is consistent with earlier U.K. studies. Colling (1991), for example, shows 
that privatization in the electricity sector did not have the predicted impact 
on unions. The attempts to weaken unions through decentralization of 
authority largely failed because of the inherent centralized nature of the 
service. Ferner and Colling (1991) further show that privatization does not 
necessarily improve industrial relations and that analysis should be carried 
out on a case-by-case basis. In a comprehensive review of over 75 studies 
in the U.K., Marsh (1991) found that a main impact of privatization on 
employees was deterioration in pay and conditions and a loss of jobs.
Union Opposition
Researchers have found employee opposition to be a significant 
negative factor in contracting out cases (National Commission, 1988; 
Ferris and Graddy, 1986). Studies provide support for the hypothesis that 
the labour-management relationship influences the decision to privatize 
(Chandler and Feuille, 1994). They found that cities in which there is a 
cooperative relationship are less likely to implement privatization than are 
non-union cities. However, cities with a more adversarial relationship with 
the union are more likely to privatize sanitation services. A problem with 
cross-sectional studies is their failure to answer the question of causality. 
One cannot rule out the reverse hypothesis that privatization consideration 
caused the adversarial relationship. It seems equally plausible, for example, 
that the consideration of privatization by a city could turn an otherwise 
cooperative relationship into a confrontational one. Only a longitudinal 
methodology can resolve this causality problem.
A broader view of privatization casts the restructuring decision not as 
a dichotomy between public and private but as a range of options, some of 
which may elicit employee opposition and others not (Warner and Hebdon, 
2001; Warner and Hefetz, 2002; Brown and Potoski, 2003). For example, 
opposition may result from privatization or cessation of services where the 
size and scope of government is reduced, thus eliminating public service 
jobs. Restructuring that involves cooperation between governments to 
jointly administer services without affecting line employees may have a 
neutral impact on opposition. Finally, contracting back in services previously 
contracted out may increase the public provision of services and elicit support 
from public employees and their unions (Warner and Hebdon, 2001).
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This model of local government sees managers operating in a very 
practical world where decisions are made in a non-ideological context. 
Rather than downsize government for its own sake, they will typically 
expand and diminish the role of the public sector at the same time through 
a complex mix of restructuring strategies.
Thus, union opposition to restructuring was found when privatization 
played a primary role in the mix of management strategies (Warner and 
Hebdon, 2001). Unions were less likely to oppose management strategies 
that expanded public employment. Unionization ceased to be significant 
when local governments employed a more complex mix of alternatives, 
which might expand public services through contracting services back in. 
Union opposition, therefore, was influenced by management restructuring 
choices.
Those few studies which have acknowledged the reverse privatization 
(i.e., contracting back in) phenomenon have not included it in their analysis 
(Chandler and Feuille, 1991, Kodrazycki, 1998). An exception is the paper 
by Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) that identified a process of 
“switching” services back and forth between public and private sectors.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In the Warner and Hebdon (2001) mailed survey of towns and counties 
in upstate New York, recipients were asked to provide written cases of 
restructuring and telephone numbers of key management contact persons. 
This open-ended question produced 70 contacts.1
Questions were asked about the fate of the affected workers (if any) and 
conditions of employment in the privatized firm. The survey resulted in 54 
usable responses of which, 39 were cases of privatization, nine were cases 
of contracting back in to the public sector, and the remaining six cases were 
contracting out to other government or non-profit employers. There were 
1. The purpose of the Privatization survey was to investigate the specific cases of privatiza-
tion and reverse privatization in New York town and county services. The survey consisted 
of four parts: (1) general questions about the privatization or reverse privatization case; (2) 
questions about the affected employees; (3) questions about the employee/management 
(and where applicable, union/management) relationships before and after the privatization 
or reverse privatization, and (4) questions about the employment conditions in the private 
entity involved in the privatization or reverse privatization. The Privatization survey 
was conducted on a sample of 70 cases between March 3, 1998 and March 17, 1998 by 
telephone using a CATI (computer-assisted telephone interview) system. The names of 
the respondents were given by town supervisors and county administrators in an earlier 
mailed survey about privatization of local government services.
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242 workers affected in the 39 cases of privatization (Table 3).2 A broad 
range of services was affected (e.g., payroll, school bus drivers, solid waste, 
snow plowing, ambulance, airport management, and human services).
Because it is unlikely that managers would volunteer privatization 
failures, there is a potential selection bias in the reporting of these 70 cases. 
To verify the information provided by managers, an attempt was made to 
contact the union representative where a union was involved in the case. 
This process had limited success due to the lack of knowledge of the case 
on the part of the union representative or their unavailability. Thus, it was 
not possible to rigorously assess the impact of the bias except to point out 
that the reported cases probably understate the negative labour effects of 
restructuring.
In order to examine union opposition, employee morale, and the 
effect of adjustment policies, it was necessary to build a model to control 
for various factors. As discussed above, the early public administration 
literature examined privatization in the form of contracting out as a 
dichotomy between private and public provision. The decision to contract 
out was found to be more likely when there are greater cost savings 
from wages, more fiscal pressure to reduce public service costs, and less 
opposition from such public service constituencies as the elderly, lower 
income groups, and public employees (Ferris, 1986). Privatization models 
typically included the cost of service provision, local economic conditions, 
complexity and size of government, and unionization (Kodrazycki, 1994, 
1998; Stein, 1990; Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995).
To provide a more rigorous test of various hypotheses about the role 
of adjustment policies and important various factors in the privatization 
decision-making process, a model is constructed to perform multiple 
regression analysis. The two dependent variables that are employed are 
employee opposition and employee morale. Opposition is a dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 if there was employee or union opposition to 
the privatization, 0 otherwise. Employee morale is a variable with a value 
of 2 indicating a positive atmosphere, 1 neutral, and 0 a negative one. Given 
these distributions, logistic regression is used in the case of opposition and 
tobit analysis for morale.
The regression sample is restricted to the 39 cases of privatization for 
profit.3 The model includes independent variables that record the presence 
of various adjustment policies (moved employees to another county 
2. The mean number of employees affected was 4.8 and the standard deviation was 9.5.
3. The most rigorous method to test the hypothesis of less employee opposition in cases of 
contracting back in would be to include these cases and add a dummy variable. It was 
not possible to employ it because the matrix would not converge since the employee 
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MOVEDC and offered early retirement EARLYRET), the existence of a 
union (UNION), whether the employees are skilled or not (SKILLED), and 
whether the following factors were important (legal/political, community 
values, and contract monitoring).4
Because of the small size of the sample, it was necessary to omit 
variables where there was no strong theoretical reason for including them 
or where they were highly insignificant. The number of employees affected 
was dropped from the analysis because it was not significant in any of the 
regressions. This was not the expected result since we anticipated greater 
opposition where a large number of employees was affected. The following 
factors were also not included in the analysis: economic, budgetary, 
management, local employment, service quality, availability of information 
and past experience with restructuring. Note that reasons of parsimony, the 
legal and political factors were combined into one variable.
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis on Wages and Benefits. Given the mixed findings in the 
literature, the effect on wages and benefits could not be predicted.
Hypothesis on Employment Effects. Similarly, the employment effects 
are indeterminate.
Hypothesis on Race and Gender. Given that public employment has 
higher than average levels of women and visible minorities than societal 
averages, it was expected that there will be disproportionately more 
women and minorities affected by privatization. A more rigorous test of 
this proposition would be to compare race and gender proportions in the 
sample with the expected rate based on the average rate for women and 
visible minorities in public employment in the areas affected.
Hypothesis on Union Effects: Unionization. Given the findings in the 
literature and the higher union density in the public sector (especially in 
New York), privatization is expected to reduce unionization levels.
Hypothesis on Union Effects: Union Opposition and Employee Morale.
It was expected that union opposition would be reduced and morale 
increased where an adjustment policy existed or if the case involved the 
contracting back in of previously contracted out work. If, for example, the 
town guaranteed no layoffs and provided for early retirement, less opposition 
would be expected. On the other hand, the presence of such a strong policy 
opposition ‘1’ values were perfectly correlated with the ‘0’ values of the contracting 
back in dummy variable.
4. More detail on the important factors is available on request from the author. 
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may have been a response to opposition. It is further anticipated that a case 
of contracting in of work would generate less opposition from employees 
and higher morale since jobs are not threatened and in some cases, unions 
may be gaining members.
RESULTS
Wages and Benefits. The data in Table 1 reveal that private contractor 
wages and benefits were not substantially different from those of the public 
employers. Slightly more employees received lower wages and benefits 
than those receiving higher compensation but for the largest category of 
contractors, wage and benefits were about the same.
TABLE 1
Comparison of Wages and Benefits, Public Employers and
Private Contractors, New York State, 1990–1995 (39 cases)
Cases Employees
Wages higher in private contractor 08 018
Wages lower in private contractor 08 028
Wages about the same in private contractor 21 138
Missing cases 02
Total 39 184
Benefits higher in private contractor 08 018
Benefits lower in private contractor 07 039
Benefits about the same in private contractor 15 109
Missing cases 09
Total 39 166
Employment Effects. Retraining was the most common adjustment 
policy, applying to 36 percent of employees affected by privatization (Table 
2). The next highest category covering 32.2 percent of employees was to 
have no policy. Only 23 percent of employees found jobs with the private 
sector firm and an even smaller number (3.7 percent) obtained another job 
in the local town or county. The picture presented here is not as bleak as 
the national survey discussed above that showed that two-thirds of cities 
reported no labour adjustment strategy for privatization (Jackson, 1997). 
On the other hand, the adjustment policies that were found here do not 
support the rosy picture of privatization that some proponents portray (see 
Savas, 2000).
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TABLE 2
How Employees Were Affected by Contracting Out to Private Sector, 
Towns and Counties in New York State, 1990–1995 (26 cases)*
Category Privatization
Cases % of total cases 
(26)
Employees % of total emps. 
(242)
Retrained 11 42.3 87 35.9
Found other job in 
town or county
05 19.2 09 03.7
Moved to private firm 09 34.6 56 23.1
Early retirement 04 15.4 06 02.5
Formal layoff 08 30.8 11 04.5
None 07 26.9 78 32.2
* In 13 of the 39 cases there were no employees affected by privatization. Per-
centages are expressed as a proportion of 26 cases and 242 affected employees. 
Please note that columns cannot be totalled because in some cases more than 
one policy applied to one employee.
Race and Gender. The question that was examined was this: are 
disproportionately more women and minorities contracted out in relation 
to the current employment distribution of government employers in the 
area?
The worker characteristics shown in Table 3 of those employees 
affected by privatization were compared with New York county averages 
using New York 1990 census of government data. When we assumed that 
the contracting out of 128 blue collar, 30 white collar, 5 technical, and
34 professional employees would be made based on the census of 
government as to the proportion of women in each of these occupational 
categories for actual counties surveyed, the results predicted that from 
61–68 women would be affected.5 Since the actual number affected was 
98, it is concluded that women were adversely impacted by privatization. 
This result occurred despite the relatively high number of typically male 
blue-collar employees affected.
5. This calculation was based on census of government data for the proportion of women by 
occupation in upstate counties: 16–18 percent of blue collar, 75–80 percent white collar, 
36–60 percent technical, and 48–61 percent professional.
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TABLE 3
Characteristics of Employees Affected by Contracting Out to Private Sector, 
Towns and Counties in New York State, 1990–1995 (26 cases)*
Category Privatization
Cases % of cases 
(26)
Employees % of emps. 
(242)
Skill level
– Unskilled 09 34.6 032 13.2
– Partly skilled 09 34.6 058 24.0
– Skilled 13 50.0 104 43.0
– Highly skilled 07 26.9 043 17.8
Occupation type
– Blue collar 18 69.2 128 52.9
– White collar 06 23.1 030 12.4
– Technical 07 26.9 005 02.1
– Professional 02 03.8 034 14.0
Women 19 73.1 098 40.5
Visible minorities 04 15.4 009 03.7
Part time 13 50.0 052 21.5
Union 09 34.6 134 55.4
* In 13 of the 39 cases there were no employees affected by privatization. 
Percentages are expressed as a proportion of 26 cases and 242 affected 
employees.
A similar calculation can be made with respect to visible minorities. 
According to the census of government data, the proportion of visible 
minorities in these occupations in upstate New York local government 
averages about 1 percent. Thus, even the relatively small proportion of 
affected visible minorities of 3.7 percent is substantially more than the 
predicted number of 1 percent based on existing minority proportions in 
the four occupational groups.
Union Effects: Unionization. Table 4 shows that out of 134 unionized 
workers before contracting out, 98 lost unionization status as a result of 
privatization. This means that 73 percent of all unionized jobs in the survey 
lost their union status after contracting out. This de-unionizing effect of 
privatization supports the hypothesis of Dantico (1987) and was similar to 
the U.K. experience.
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TABLE 4
Unionization Losses Due to Privatization, New York State Survey,
1990–1995 (39 cases)*
Before privatization After privatization
Cases Employees Cases Change Employees Change
Non-union cases 30 108 36 + 6 206 + 98
Unionized cases 09 134 03 – 6 036 – 98
Total 39 242 39 242
* Unions actually lost eight out of the nine bargaining units but gained two because 
two of the private contractors were unionized. Hence the “after privatization” 
total of three unionized units.
Union Effects: Union Opposition and Employee Morale. The regression 
results in Table 5, column 1, show that unionized towns were 68.5 percent 
more likely to oppose privatization. Union presence, however, had no 
significant impact on employee morale (column 2).
It was anticipated that union opposition would be substantially less in 
the cases where work is brought back in house. While multiple regression 
analysis was not possible, a bivariate correlation coefficient of –.316 
with union opposition (significant at the 2 percent level), indicated union 
support in these contracting back in cases. In addition, in the six cases of 
contracting out to other governments, there were no cases of employee or 
union opposition. These results contrast sharply with the significance of 
the union variable in the regression analysis and provide support for the 
Warner and Hebdon (2001) result showing that towns and counties that 
employ a mix of restructuring strategies that include contracting in may 
mute union opposition.
The only adjustment policy that was significantly associated with both 
higher opposition and lower morale was moving employees to another 
county. While the policy may seem progressive, it is believed that the 
negative result was obtained because of the conflict that preceded the 
policy. In this case, the policy may reflect a conflict-laden process between 
employers and the towns that employed this approach.
Other factors. Where skilled employees were involved, there were 
more negative effects on morale when compared to less-skilled occupations. 
Perhaps skilled employees have a greater expectation that their work will 
not be contracted out.
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TABLE 5
Regression Coefficients, Employee Opposition to Privatization,
New York Towns and Counties, 1990–1995 [marginal effects]
(“t” statistics in parentheses)
Employee
Opposition (logit)
Employee Morale 
(tobit)
Union exists 006.611** 00 .267
00 [.685] 00[.256]
0 (2.16) 00(.94)
Adjustment policies 
– Moved employees to other county 011.527** 0 –.160*
0 [1.195]   [–.585]
0 (2.06) –(1.68)
– Early retirement 004.245 0 –.556
00 [.440] 0[–.534]
0 (1.40) (–1.56)
Skilled employees 0–4.559 0 –.769**
0 [–.427]   [–.738]
 (–1.59) (–2.88)
Important factors
– Legal/political 0–3.882** 0 –.019
0 [–.402] 0[–.018]
 (–2.30) 0(–.17)
– Community values 0–7.445** 00 .077
0 [–.772] 00[.074]
 (–2.23) 00(.32)
– Monitoring 0 4.869* 0 –.855**
00 [.505] 0[–.820]
0 (1.67) (–3.28)
Constant 012.097** 0 2.456**
0 (2.40) 0(4.89)
Equation Statistics Log. Like. =
–9.079
Log. Like. =
–34.098
N 39 39
* p < .10 (critical t = 1.645, two-tailed test) ** p < .05 (critical t = 1.960, two-tailed 
test)
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Only the important factors of community values, legal/political, and 
contract monitoring were significant in the regressions. Towns where 
community values were more prevalent were significantly less likely to 
encounter employee opposition. This result may reflect a privatization 
project that is not so much driven by ideology as by community concerns 
about service quality. In such cases, downsizing government is less likely to 
be a goal and employee concerns are more likely to be taken into account. 
The interpretation of lower opposition where legal and political issues 
were important indicates the strength of a strong legal or political mandate. 
Conversely, when there is weak political support for restructuring, there 
is a greater possibility of employee opposition. Neither community values 
nor legal/political factors significantly affected morale.
Finally, where the monitoring of the contract was important, opposition 
was greater and morale was lower. More complex contracts where 
specification is difficult may generate employee opposition because existing 
employees find their role diminished to one of contract monitors (see Kettl, 
2002: 206).
CONCLUSION
Local government privatization in New York State was found to
have some harmful effects on workers. Surprisingly, few local employers 
had adjustment policies to protect affected employees and disproportionate 
negative impacts were found on women and minorities. Privatization was 
found to have significant de-unionizing effects with substantially fewer 
workers in unions after restructuring. On the other hand, privatization had 
no pronounced impact on wages and benefits. In the majority of cases, 
wages and benefits were about the same after privatization.
In terms of employee opposition, where community values were
an important factor, towns experienced less opposition. Employee morale 
was significantly lower for skilled employees and where contract monitoring 
was important. These findings may be attributed to the perceived watering 
down of the role of skilled and professional workers. Privatization may 
reduce the practice of their profession or craft to the role of contract 
monitor.
Evidence was found that the role of unions in the restructuring process 
is not one of automatic opposition. Unions were the catalyst for opposition 
actions, but only in for-profit restructuring cases. In the nine cases that 
involved contracting work back into the public sector, unions supported 
restructuring changes, and in the six cases of contracting out to another 
government, there was no union opposition.
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There is a need for more research into the post-privatization effects 
on workers and their organizations. Greater efforts ought to be made to 
match management and union accounts of privatization. A wider research 
agenda would also include national surveys with longitudinal data to resolve 
causality questions.
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RÉSUMÉ
L’impartition des services publics dans l’État de New York : les 
effets sur la main-d’œuvre
Confrontés à des pressions financières et à des idéologies néo-
conservatrices, les gestionnaires publics ont, de façon croissante, restructuré 
les services publics en Amérique du Nord. La sous-traitance, qui est la 
forme de privatisation la plus analysée, a occupé le cœur du débat sur le 
rôle du secteur privé dans la fourniture de services publics (Savas, 2000; 
Sclar, 2000). Toutefois, on ne retrouve pas d’analyse sérieuse de l’impact 
des restructurations sur les salariés et leurs syndicats. Cet essai cherche à 
corriger cette lacune en effectuant une analyse de l’effet de l’impartition de 
services sur les syndicats et les employés à un niveau local de gouvernement 
dans l’État de New York.
Les cas retenus pour fin d’analyse sont tirés d’une étude plus vaste 
portant sur les municipalités et les comtés de la partie supérieure de l’État 
de New York (en dehors de la ville même) (Warner et Hebdon, 2001). Dans 
cette étude menée en 1997, nous avions interrogé les officiers élus sur les 
décisions de restructuration depuis 1990 et demandé aux répondants de nous 
fournir une description brève des cas de restructuration en y ajoutant le nom 
d’une personne-ressource et son numéro de téléphone. Avec l’aide d’une 
équipe utilisant l’informatique de l’Université Cornell, nous avons effectué, 
en se servant de ces contacts, une enquête téléphonique pour analyser les 
effets sur la main-d’œuvre de la sous-traitance de services.
Le contexte de l’État de New York. Compte tenu des niveaux élevés de 
syndicalisation, de la présence de la loi de Taylor dans l’État de New York 
et de l’attitude des gouverneurs généralement démocratiques et favorables 
aux travailleurs, l’État de New York était l’un des états le moins privatisé 
au pays en 1995. En 1992, New York a connu un changement politique à 
l’arrivée d’un gouverneur républicain, George Pataki, avec un ordre du jour 
de projets de privatisation agressive (voir le rapport Lauder, 1992). Compte
tenu de ce changement, et du fait que quelque 70 % des politiciens locaux 
couverts par la grande enquête d’où proviennent ces cas étaient d’allégeance 
républicaine, on s’attendait à une nouvelle vague de privatisation. Les cas 
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retenus pour cet essai se sont présentés au cours de la période de trois ans 
qui a suivi immédiatement l’élection du gouverneur George Pataki.
Revue des études antérieures. En ce qui concerne les effets sur les 
travailleurs, les partisans de la privatisation soutiennent qu’ils ne perdent 
pas leur sécurité d’emploi, leurs salaires et autres conditions de travail, ni 
leur syndicalisation suite à la sous-traitance (Savas, 2000). D’un autre côté, 
d’autres croient que les employés du secteur public subissent des baisses de 
salaires et des pertes d’emploi (Kuttner, 1999). De plus, les syndicats de ce 
secteur ont soutenu que la sous-traitance affectait négativement les salaires 
et les avantages sociaux, se traduisait souvent par une perte d’emplois, 
qu’elle était une menace à la fois pour les syndicats et la négociation 
collective et qu’elle aurait un effet encore plus négatif pour la main-d’œuvre 
féminine et les minorités (Dantico, 1987).
Il y a peu d’études sur les effets de la privatisation sur les travailleurs 
(World Bank, 1999). Cependant, une étude du gouvernement fédéral aux 
États-Unis fait figure d’exception (GAO, 1985). Elle démontre que 53 % des 
travailleurs qui ont accepté du travail de la part de sous-traitants recevaient 
une rémunération plus faible, 21 % obtenaient des salaires plus élevés et 
dans 25 % des cas, les salaires demeuraient les mêmes. Au niveau local 
du gouvernement, on a également constaté que les salaires offerts par les 
sous-traitants étaient inférieurs dans le cas des conducteurs d’autobus et des 
mécaniciens, même lorsque ces sous-traitants étaient syndiqués (Peterson, 
Davis et Walker, 1986). Au Canada, une étude sur la privatisation à Poste 
Canada a révélé que les salariés des postes impliqués ont connu des taux de 
chômage post-privatisation deux fois et demi plus élevés que la moyenne 
nationale, et cela en dépit d’une politique d’ajustement favorable de la part 
de l’employeur (White et Janzen, 2000).
On a aussi constaté que la privatisation avait exercé une effet négatif 
sur les minorités en les déplaçant de façon démesurée suite à la sous-
traitance, et cela en réduisant leurs occasions de mobilité d’emploi et leur 
niveau de vie, tout en élargissant ainsi l’écart salarial discriminatoire entre 
les minorités et la population blanche. Thurow (1982) a constaté que les 
salaires des femmes étaient 20 % plus élevés et les salaires des minorités 
30 % plus élevés dans le secteur public que dans celui du privé. Ce résultat 
est principalement attribuable à des niveaux plus élevés de responsabilité 
réalisés par les femmes et la minorité noire chez l’État employeur.
Au Royaume-Uni, Pendleton (1999) a effectué une comparaison 
des conditions de travail entre 22 entreprises privatisées et 25 du secteur 
public dans l’industrie du transport par autobus. Il a constaté peu ou pas 
de différences entre le privé et le public quant au degré de pénétration 
syndicale et à la négociation collective. Cependant, les salaires étaient plus 
faibles de façon importante dans les entreprises du privé. Dans une revue 
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exhaustive de plus de 75 études au Royaume-Uni, Marsh (1991) a constaté 
que l’effet principal de la privatisation sur les salariés se traduisait par une 
détérioration de la rémunération et des autres conditions de travail et par 
des pertes d’emploi.
La documentation sur l’opposition syndicale eu égard à la privatisation 
présente une décision de restructuration non pas comme une dichotomie 
entre le public et le privé, mais plutôt comme une des options, dont certaines 
peuvent créer de la résistance chez les employés et d’autres non (Warner 
et Hebdon, 2001; Warner et Hefetz, 2002; Brown et Potoski, 2003). Par 
exemple, l’opposition peut résulter de la privatisation ou d’une cessation des 
services là où la taille et l’action du gouvernement sont réduites, éliminant 
ainsi des emplois dans les services publics. Une restructuration qui implique 
une collaboration entre le gouvernement et des services gérés conjointement 
sans avoir d’effets sur les salariés de première ligne peut avoir un effet 
neutre sur la résistance. Enfin, le fait de reprendre des services auparavant 
confiés à la sous-traitance peut accroître la prestation publique de services 
et susciter une collaboration de la part des employés du secteur public et 
de leurs syndicats (Warner et Hebdon, 2001).
Conclusion. On a constaté que la privatisation au sein des administrations 
locales de l’État de New York avait des effets désastreux sur les travailleurs. 
À notre grande surprise, nous avons observé que peu d’employeurs avaient 
des politiques d’ajustement susceptibles de protéger les employés impliqués 
et que des effets négatifs démesurés se produisaient chez les femmes et les 
minorités. La privatisation s’accompagnait d’effets de désyndicalisation, 
alors qu’on retrouvait moins de travailleurs dans les syndicats après une 
restructuration. D’un autre côté, la privatisation n’avait aucun effet sensible 
sur les salaires et les avantages sociaux. Dans la plupart des cas, les salaires 
et les avantages étaient les mêmes après la privatisation.
Il n’y a pas de preuve à l’effet que le rôle des syndicats dans un 
processus de restructuration en soit un de résistance systématique. Les 
syndicats apparaissaient comme le catalyseur d’une action d’opposition 
seulement dans les cas de restructuration dans des entreprises à but lucratif. 
Dans les neuf cas qui impliquaient la reprise du travail sous-traité dans 
le secteur public, les syndicats ont appuyé les changements inhérents 
à la restructuration et, dans les six cas de sous-traitance par une autre 
administration, il n’y a pas eu de résistance de la part des syndicats.
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